HACKERS INVADE ST. LOUIS ONCE AGAIN AT @ShowMeConSTL!

HACKERS INVADE ST. LOUIS ONCE AGAIN AT SHOWMECON!

Be a Part of St. Louis’ ONLY Premier Hacking & Offensive Cyber Security Conference—June 8 & 9, 2015

SHOWMECON. The name says it all. Known as the Show Me State, 2015ShowMeCon300x250eMissouri is home to St. Louis-based ethical hacking firm, Parameter Security, and security training company, Hacker University. Together, they are bringing you a one-of-a-kind event that will Show You the State of security from a unique perspective – the hacker’s viewpoint.

This highly technical forum showcases eye-opening presentations from world-renown ethical hackers and epic security ninjas which will leave you amazed and frightened at the same time. By giving you access into the mind of a hacker, you will better understand how to protect your networks and critical data. As we always say “In order to beat a hacker, you have to think like one” and “if you don’t understand the enemy, how can you protect against him?” ShowMeCon pulls back the curtain and exposes how hackers are winning the war on physical and cyber security.

In addition to witnessing real-world hacks, experts will tackle a variety of specialized topics as you discover the latest vulnerabilities, the most powerful exploits and current security threats at this cutting-edge, two day con. You can also partake in our “capture the flag event” and take your best shot at hacking into various environments. Plus, preceding the conference are several training boot camps (June 3 – 7) hosted by Hacker University that will offer various hacking and security classes such as hands-on hacking, router hacking, network defense, the updated CISSP certification boot camp and more.

Whether you’re a large corporation or a small business, you should attend this mind-blowing event as you witness the cream of the crop unveil the latest attacks, techniques, tactics and practices of today’s hackers. Plus, gain insight and understanding into ways to effectively protect yourself so you can implement this information immediately when you return to your business.

ShowMeCon will be held at the Ameristar Casino & Resort in St. Charles, Missouri.

For more information on the conference, training boot camps and exhibitor/sponsorships, please contact us at info <at> showmecon <dot> com.

So Get Inside the Mind of a Hacker…We’ll Show You at ShowMeCon!

THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS ON THE INFORMATION ASSURANCE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRICAL ENERGY GRID Part 2 of 2

By

Melvin H. Barnes, Jr.


Read Part I of the Article here. >>

In July 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law.  The Act was primarily designed to restore investor confidence following well-publicized bankruptcies that brought chief executives, audit committees, and the independent auditors under heavy scrutiny.  The Act is applicable to all publicly registered companies under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

The Act calls for the formation of a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and specifies several requirements (“sections”) that include management’s quarterly certification of its financial results (Section 302) and management’s annual assertion that internal controls over financial reporting are effective (Section 404).  In Section 404, the independent auditor of the organization is required to opine on management’s assertion over internal control and the fair presentation of the organization’s financial statements.  This additional testing of management’s assertion is referred to as attestation examination.

Section 404 draws attention to the significant processes that feed and comprise the financial reporting for an organization.  In order for management to make its annual assertion on the effectiveness of its internal control, management must document and evaluate all controls that are deemed significant to the financial reporting process.  If the organization uses a service provider to process transactions, host data, or perform other significant services, management must look to the service organization for information on the design and operating effectiveness of the service organization’s controls.

Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires chief executive officers and chief financial officers to certify each annual and quarterly report filed with the SEC, imposes criminal penalties for false certifications, and significantly increases the penalties for security law violations (Fleming, 2004). Although the Act makes no specific mention of information technology or information security/assurance, it requires organizations to verify or certify the internal controls of key business processes. When an organization determines what the key business processes are, it must answer the question, Does the network infrastructure that supports these processes have the proper controls?

Each organization affected by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has some level of reliance on automated information systems to process and store the data that are the basis of financial reports (Byrum, 2003). Section 404 is the section that has the most impact on information technology resources and information assurance of the national electric grid infrastructure, due to the requirement of having internal controls implemented by the organization.

On May 22, 1998, President Clinton introduced Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63, which focuses on protecting the nation’s critical infrastructures from both physical and “cyber” attack (CCIPS, 1999). The nation’s electrical energy grid is a subset of one of the critical infrastructures for the United States. The nation’s critical infrastructures are energy (which the electrical grid is a subset), banking and finance, transportation, vital human services, and telecommunications. The first section of PDD-63 states:

The United States possesses both the world’s strongest military and its largest national economy. Those two aspects of our power are mutually reinforcing and dependent. They are also increasingly reliant upon certain critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based information systems.

Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services, both governmental and private. Many of the nation’s critical infrastructures have historically been physically and logically separate systems that had little interdependence. As a result of advances in information technology and the necessity of improved efficiency, however, these infrastructures have become increasingly automated and interlinked. These same advances have created new vulnerabilities to equipment failure, human error, weather and other natural causes, and physical and cyber attacks. Addressing these vulnerabilities will necessarily require flexible, evolutionary approaches that span both the public and private sectors, and protect both domestic and international security.

Because of our military strength, future enemies, whether nations, groups or individuals, may seek to harm us in nontraditional ways, including attacks within the United States. Because our economy is increasingly reliant upon interdependent and cyber-supported infrastructures, non-traditional attacks on our infrastructure and information systems may be capable of significantly harming both our military power and our economy (Clinton, 1998).

To carry out PDD-63, a government/commercial partnership was required that exceeded the working relationship between the military and industry. The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., is a joint government/private sector partnership and includes representatives from the relevant agencies of federal, state, and local governments and the private sector to address the daunting challenge of protecting the critical infrastructures on which our nation depends (CCIPS, 1999).

PDD-63 was superseded by Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7 on December 17, 2003. The creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was followed by the transfer of certain critical infrastructure protection responsibilities from other agencies and departments to the Department of Homeland Security.

The purpose of HSPD-7 was stated as:

This directive establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities (Bush, 2003).

HSPD-7 assigned roles and responsibilities to sector-specific federal agencies. The U.S. Department of Energy was assigned the responsibility for the nation’s energy critical infrastructure. Section 16 of the directive provided authority to establish a focal point for cyber-security. Section 16 states:

The Secretary will continue to maintain an organization to serve as a focal point for the security of cyberspace. The organization will facilitate interactions and collaborations between and among Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, the private sector, academia and international organizations. To the extent permitted by law, Federal departments and agencies with cyber expertise, including but not limited to the Departments of Justice, Commerce, the Treasury, Defense, Energy, and State, and the Central Intelligence Agency, will collaborate with and support the organization in accomplishing its mission. The organization’s mission includes analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and aiding national recovery efforts for critical infrastructure information systems. The organization will support the Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies in their continuing missions to investigate and prosecute threats to and attacks against cyberspace, to the extent permitted by law (Bush, 2003).

The differences between the two directives are not extremely large but they do reflect the change in American concerns following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The original purpose of PDD-63 was to require federal agencies to ensure the continuity and viability of physical and computer-based systems essential for minimal functioning of the U.S. government and economy in case of a terrorist attack. With the enactment of HSPD-7, the federal departments and agencies are required to develop methods and technologies to protect all critical infrastructures and key resources of the government and economic sectors.

The primary goal of HSPD-7 is to prevent the exploitation, incapacitation, or destruction of these infrastructures and resources. A secondary goal, however, is to foster the development of methods and technologies that can minimize the impact if an adverse event actually occurs. Federal departments and agencies have been instructed to work with state and local governments, and with the private sector, to accomplish the objectives laid out in this directive.

It is my assertion that the federal government’s goal of increased competition has had a negative impact on the security of the national electrical grid from an information technology standpoint. Government regulations that sought to provide transparency to corporate governance and increase competition in the electrical energy industry have opened a new age. Today, the control of electrical energy systems and resources has moved from dedicated channels to the Internet. The Internet provides access to all information technology systems regardless of their physical location. Nonetheless, the challenge for today’s electrical energy system is no longer a purely physical concern; it is now an information assurance concern.

Is my assertion true?

Thoughts?

Read part I of the Article here. >>

 

 

Twitter: @mhbjr

LinkedIn: Melvin Barnes, Jr.

Google+: Melvin Barnes, Jr.

 

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THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS ON THE INFORMATION ASSURANCE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRICAL ENERGY GRID Part 1 of 2

By

Melvin H. Barnes, Jr.


The structure of today’s electrical energy industry is far removed from the structure of the industry of the 1970s and 1980s. The electrical energy industry of the past was composed of utilities that supplied electricity to a specific geographical area. The utilities of that time were called vertically integrated utilities (VIUs). The interconnection of the VIUs in North America comprised the national electrical energy grid. There were more than 3,100 electric utilities in North America (U.S. Department of Energy, 2006).

In the past, a typical VIU owned and controlled the power generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. Consumers of electricity, whether they were industrial or residential, had one source for their electrical power needs, the VIU. This is not to say that a VIU was an island onto itself, however. In the past, neighboring utilities established interconnections among themselves and with each other to increase supply options, to augment reliability, and to share reserves economically (U.S. Department of Energy, 2001). There were three interconnections in the country: Eastern Interconnect, Western Interconnect, and Texas Interconnect. Figure 1 shows the boundaries of the interconnections.

 

Figure 1: Major Transmission Networks (U.S. Department of Energy, 2001)

This system did not lend itself to the transfer of electricity between the interconnections. Energy transfer between the interconnections was limited. Each grid (interconnection), therefore, operated as a single large utility and functioned with a common set of operating guidelines (U.S. Department of Energy, 2001). Yet, several commonalities existed between the interconnections, one being how their systems were controlled.

Control of the electrical generators and substations was and still is via Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCADA systems were not designed with security as one of the requirements as a top priority. Instead, security was achieved by lack of access to these control systems. SCADA systems were accessed by dedicated communications lines or closed networks, thus physical security was the main concern for VIUs. Process control and SCADA systems, with their reliance on proprietary networks and hardware, were considered immune to the network attacks that have wreaked havoc on corporate information systems (Byres and Lowe, 2004). But the introduction of Internet-based information technology within the process controls industry has increased vulnerabilities to the industry’s computer systems (Falco, Stouffer, Wavering, and Proctor, 2002).

Change in the electrical energy industry began in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Industrial and commercial energy consumers lobbied the federal government to press that cheaper rates could be realized by buying energy from corporations other than the local VIU.

As a result of their lobbying effort, government regulations designed to increase competition were drafted and implemented. The first regulation that pertains to this study was Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order No. 888, which removed impediments to competition in the wholesale bulk power marketplace and brought more efficient, lower cost power to the nation’s electricity consumers (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 1996).

FERC Order No. 888 was issued on April 24, 1996. Essentially, the order was a final rule regarding electric industry restructuring. Prior to implementation of this order the electrical energy marketplace consisted of geographic monopolies that did not allow independent operators entry onto the electrical grid. Thus FERC Order No. 888:

  • Requires transmission owners who purchase transmission service to offer nondiscriminatory, comparable transmission service to others seeking such services over its own facilities. This often is referred to as the “open access” rule.
  • Has a goal to ensure that potential suppliers of electricity have equal access to the market.
  • Encourages the creation of a separate Price Exchange to reveal market-clearing prices for electricity in the new competitive market (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 1996).

On March 4, 1997, FERC Order No. 888-A was issued, which reaffirmed the basic determinations in the original order and clarifies certain terms (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 1997a). It should be noted, however, that the order did not recommend a change or upgrade to the infrastructure of the electrical grid. The national electrical grid was not designed to support the markets for the sale of electric power.

FERC Order No. 889 was also issued on March 4, 1997. In this order, the Commission addresses the requests for rehearing Order No. 889, our final rule requiring public utilities that own, control, or operate facilities used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce to create or participate in an Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) site (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 1997b). Order No. 889 requires utilities to establish electronic systems to share information about available transmission capacity, thus increasing competition in the industry.

On December 20, 1999, the FERC issued Order No. 2000-A, which solidified the formation of Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). The Commission’s objective in promulgating Order No. 2000-A was to have all transmission-owning entities in the nation, including non-public utility entities, place their transmission facilities under the control of appropriate RTOs in a timely manner (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2000). The outcome of Order No. 2000-A was the end of the VIU. Although a VIU may still own transmission facilities, the control and governance now fall under the RTO in the geographic area.

In Order No. 2000-A, the Commission concluded that regional institutions could address the operational and reliability issues confronting the industry and eliminate undue discrimination in transmission services that can occur when the operation of the transmission system remains in the control of a VIU (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2000). FERC, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), had concluded that the VIU system was not providing a fair marketplace for the sale of electrical energy. The establishment of the RTO system placed the transmission facilities into one of a number of RTOs. Figure 2 shows the existing and proposed RTO configurations.

 

Figure 2: Existing and Proposed RTO Configurations (EEI, 2004)

But the order was not universally accepted. Among those in disagreement with the order was the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), the trade association of shareholder-owned electric companies. EEI’s members serve roughly 90 percent of the ultimate customers in the shareholder-owned segment of the industry, nearly 70 percent of all electric utility ultimate customers in the nation, and they generate nearly 70 percent of the electricity produced in the United States.

“We commend FERC for predicating its rule on flexibility of form and voluntary participation and we also appreciate the Commission’s demonstration in Order No. 2000 that it is open to innovative transmission ratemaking,” said EEI Executive Vice President David K. Owens. “At the same time, we urge the Commission to revisit provisions of the rulemaking that we contend are without sufficient basis in fact or law,” he added (Owens, 2000).

Check out Part II of the Article >>

The SecurityOrb Show – An Interview with Security Researcher and Author Georgia Weidman founder of Bulb Security

Georgia Weidman is a penetration tester and researcher, as well as the founder of Bulb Security, a security consulting firm. She presents at conferences around the world, including Black Hat, ShmooCon, and DerbyCon, and teaches classes on topics such as penetration testing, mobile hacking, and exploit development. She was awarded a DARPA Cyber Fast Track grant to continue her work in mobile device security.

Listen to what Georgia had to say here:



 

 

 

A Book Review of “Penetration Testing: A Hands-On Introduction to Hacking” by Georgia Weidman (@georgiaweidman)

A Book Review of “Penetration Testing: A Hands-On Introduction to Hacking”

In June of 2014 No Starch Press published “Penetration Testing: A Hands-On Introduction to Hacking” by security trainer and researcher Georgia Weidman (@georgiaweidman). Although the book has been categorized as an introductory guide to penetration testing, the information should also benefit more seasoned individuals as well. Wikipedia defines penetration testing as “an attack on a computer system with the intention of finding security weaknesses, potentially gaining access to it, its functionality and data.”

The book provides a blue print that can be used by information security practitioners who are tasked in ensuring an organization’s security posture as well as checking to confirm if employees are abiding to the security policies that are in place. Moreover, as an educator, I quickly realized the practical usefulness of “Penetration Testing: A Hands-On Introduction to Hacking” would serve in a classroom and lab environment.

The table of contents represents an orderly and organized method to learning the material in the book.  The book begins with an introduction, a very informative section titled “Penetration Testing Primer” that laid out the purpose of the book and builds to more advance concepts and practices in later chapters.  The body of the book consists of five parts, twenty well-written chapters as well as a resource and index section.  Each chapter in the book ends with a chapter summary recapping the main topics.

Part I titled “The Basics” consist of four chapters that provided outstanding information that would be advantageous in later chapters as well as in the readers’ personal computing activity. The chapters consist of “Setting Up Your Virtual Lab” (Chapter 1), “Using Kali Linux” (Chapter 2), “Programming” (Chapter 3) and “Using the Metasploit Framework” (Chapter 4). The author provided a meticulous step-by-step process, which aided in the successful implementation of the reader’s pen-testing environment, the installation/explanation of the Kali tool, networking and additional testing tools. The author also provided instructions about various computer programming/scripting languages that penetration testers can use to enhance when conducting testing on information resources. Lastly, Metasploit is examined for its use in exploitation and risk factors capability.

In part II titled “Assessments” it consisted of three chapters that provided detectable and undetected techniques to collect information about an organization or computer. The chapters are as follows “Information Gathering (Chapter 5), Finding Vulnerabilities (Chapter 6) and Capturing Traffic (Chapter 7). In chapter 5, “Information gathering”, the author stressed that before starting an active penetration test, the tester must collect as much information as possible. This can be accomplished through the use of “Open Source Intelligence Gathering” tools such as “Net craft” and “Whois Lookups” to name a few. While in chapter 7, “Finding Vulnerabilities” and chapter 8, “Capturing Traffic”, the author guides us through the process of vulnerability analysis for the propose of obtain better target success and traffic capturing to collect and manipulate packets to gain information from other computer systems.

Part III titled “Attacks” consisted of eight of the following chapters “Exploitation” (Chapter 8),
“Password Attacks” (Chapter 9), “Client-Side Exploitation” (Chapter 10), “Social Engineering”
(Chapter 11), “Bypassing Antivirus Applications” (Chapter 12), “Post Exploitation” (Chapter 13), “Web Application Testing” (Chapter 14) and “Wireless Attacks” (Chapter 15) provided scores of exciting information about attacking a target. In this section the author builds from the preparatory work of the assessment (Part II) section of the book to conduct precision attacks. Many concepts are discussed such as default password attacks, exploiting open NFS share, browser, and PDF and Java exploitation. I found the use of the social-engineering toolkit (SET) in “Social Engineering (Chapter 11) to be one of my favorite parts of the book. In this chapter, the authors used SET to conduct spear phishing, web-based and email attacks on a target. This is an excellent way a security practitioner can test to determine if employees are adhering to the organization’s security policies. Post exploitation and wireless attacks were also well covered.

In part IV titled “Exploit Development” the author took a turn from using ready available tools such as Metasploit to attack a target, to using writing our own exploit code. I found this section to be a bit of a challenge, but if you stick with it and do additional research, it will become clearer as time and repeated learning occurs.

As for the last component of the book part V “Mobile Hacking” consist of using the Smartphone Pentest Framework (Chapter 20). This section explains and allows the reader to understand the issues organizations face when employees bring their own device and connects to the network. The chapter discusses the mobile attack vectors that exist such as text messaging, near field communications and QR codes. The introduction and installation process of the Smartphone Pentest Framework is provided. The author provides detail steps on testing and attacking mobile devices and apps. If is obvious, this is one of the author’s strong technical areas.

The appendix and index also provided some additional information the reader should be able to build on and obtain extra reading information to assist in understanding the background thoughts in the book.

The author’s approach of the book was comprehensive for both the beginner and seasoned security individual.  The information would serve valuable in the educational environment as well as in the professional training environment. I found the book to be well written and to follow a logical pattern in its concepts.

This book is a contribution to the information security community and will likely aid in producing knowledgeable information security practitioners in the future.  I personally enjoyed topics in the assessment portion of the book as well as the use of the Social-Engineering Tool-kit. I do recommend that if you are interested in penetration testing, would like to know more about topic or curious, this book would be a great source.

The book is available at books stores as well as online and can be purchased at the No Starch Press website here or at Amazon here.

References

Weidman, Georgia (2014). Penetration Testing: A Hands-On Introduction to Hacking. No Starch Press

 

Table of Contents

Foreword by Peter Van Eeckhoutte
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Penetration Testing Primer

Part 1: The Basics

Chapter 1: Setting Up Your Virtual Lab
Chapter 2: Using Kali Linux
Chapter 3: Programming
Chapter 4: Using the Metasploit Framework

Part 2: Assessments

Chapter 5: Information Gathering
Chapter 6: Finding Vulnerabilities
Chapter 7: Capturing Traffic

Part 3: Attacks

Chapter 8: Exploitation
Chapter 9: Password Attacks
Chapter 10: Client-Side Exploitation
Chapter 11: Social Engineering
Chapter 12: Bypassing Antivirus Applications
Chapter 13: Post Exploitation
Chapter 14: Web Application Testing
Chapter 15: Wireless Attacks

Part 4: Exploit Development

Chapter 16: A Stack-Based Buffer Overflow in Linux
Chapter 17: A Stack-Based Buffer Overflow in Windows
Chapter 18: Structured Exception Handler Overwrites
Chapter 19: Fuzzing, Porting Exploits, and Metasploit Modules

Part 5: Mobile Hacking

Chapter 20: Using the Smartphone Pentest Framework

Resources
Index

 

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